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This paper analyses the efficiency of the mandatory bid rule under the framework 
of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids. The rule requires that anyone acquiring 
control of a listed company is obliged to make an offer to be addressed to all the 
shareholders of the target company for all their holdings at an equitable price. In the 
efforts of the EU to promote more efficient capital structures in Europe, the rule is 
mainly regarded as a protection mechanism for the minority shareholders. Apart from 
that, the rule offers certain additional advantages. However, the significance of the 
mandatory bid rule is limited mostly due to the wide discretion the Directive leaves to 
Member States. In light of cultural, structural and pre-existing regulatory differences 
among Member States, it is sensible that their flexibility in establishing additional bid 
measures and exceptions has prevented the purposes of the rule from materialising. 
Furthermore, the rule itself suffers from vague definitions which further create problems 
of interpretation and make its proper implementation much more difficult. 
 Many scholars have commented on the rule’s failure to achieve its legislat ive 
goals. After nearly a decade since the issuance of the Takeover Directive, it is a real 
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The last few years have seen a remarkable increase in the rate of acquisitions of 
listed companies. Market demands have become extremely high due to the rapid 
evolution in the area of economy. Thus, businesses are seeking to become more 
competitive and gain market control. To achieve their goal, many companies choose to 
acquire their competitors so as to join their forces and ensure their dominance in the 
market. Therefore, takeovers have become the ultimate means of corporate 
restructuring and an important corporate governance mechanism worldwide.  
In general, a takeover of a listed company is a process followed by natural or 
legal persons to acquire control over its assets, by making an offer to buy all the 
company’s shares. 
The acquisition process is not as simple as it sounds. In fact, it is a rather 
complicated process with a number of practical problems. In particular, the position of 
the shareholders in the target company and their attitude towards a potential bidder 
constitute crucial factors in achieving an acquisition.  
Some of these problems have been overridden through the adoption of legislative 
acts, which facilitate the process of takeovers and further contribute to the improvement 
of economic activities.  
In Europe, the institutional framework of acquisitions is based on Directive 
2004/25/EC on takeover bids 1 . The Directive itself highlights the significance of 
takeovers through an effort to mitigate the many problems a bidder has to confront with 
during a takeover process.  
It could be said that the whole takeover process is enshrined in one single 
provision, the Mandatory Bid Rule (MBR) of article 5 of the Takeover Directive (TOD). 
Issues like the protection of minority shareholders, the principle of equal treatment, the 
mandatory bid price and the control threshold have so far been the most debated. 
To better understand the nature and function of the EU MBR, a comparison with 
the US regulatory regime seems necessary. In the United States, the acquisition 
procedure is subject to entirely different requirements. The major difference of the US 
“Market Rule” (MR) lies in the fact that it gives considerable freedom of action to both 
                                               
1
 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids. 
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acquirers and target companies. In contrast, the European regime has placed more 
stringent restrictions through the adoption of a ‘’sharing rule’’ in the form of the MBR.  
This paper basically outlines the rationale, the scope and the efficiency of the MBR 
application. Quite a few commentators, who have studied these issues, have adopted 
the view that takeovers are in general beneficial for the market. It will be argued, 
though, that the MBR have various deficiencies which prevent the completion of its 
destined objectives. 
Under this context, a lot of controversy has also been raised about the MBR in 
relation to the breakthrough rule (Article 11 of the TOD) as well as the squeeze-out and 
the sell-out rights (Articles 15 and 16 of the TOD) which are granted after the launch of 
a mandatory bid (made to all shareholders for all their holdings); within a period of three 
months of the end of the bid, the acquirer that holds the majority of the company’s 
shares2 is able to “throw out” from the company the minority shareholders (squeeze-out 
right). Within the same period, the remaining shareholders, who did not accept the bid, 
have the right to sell their shares to the bidder afterwards and leave the company (sell-
out right). The breakthrough rule and the squeeze-out and sell-out rights constitute 
regulatory devices which together with the MBR were introduced to enhance takeover 
activity throughout the EU while protecting the interests of minority shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the deficiencies of the MBR are pervasive in the majority of the EU 
legal systems and this view is reinforced by the existing case law, as set forth below. 
Particularly in a country like Greece which is afflicted by deep economic recession, it 
would be a great challenge to investigate the legislative framework under which the rule 
applies.  
In sum, this paper is divided as follows: in the first place (Part I), a comprehensive 
overview of the EU takeover regime is given. This is done through a comparison 
approach to the US regulatory regime and the detailed presentation of the MBR 
scheme, as laid down in article 5 of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids. The second 
section (Part II) provides an overall assessment of the MBR impact on European 
markets. That assessment is supplemented by a brief description of the way the rule 
has been so far implemented in the different EU legal systems (Part III). Attention is 
                                               
2
  90 % by reference to capital and 90 % by reference to the voting rights (or 95% depending on the Member State’s 
choice), according to Article 15(2) of the Takeover Directive 
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particularly drawn to certain acquisitions of Greek listed companies. Finally, a summary 
of the findings is presented. 
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Part I. The Mandatory Bid Rule 
 
1.1. The European Takeover Directive  
  
The MBR is the product of a lengthy period of European legislative efforts. The last 
15 years, the European Union Authorities, wishing to promote capital structures and 
create a fair takeover market by offering businesses greater certainty while protecting 
both shareholders and employees, submitted a series of proposals for the 
establishment of common rules on takeovers for all EU Member States. However, those 
proposals failed to be adopted mainly due to the disagreements between Member 
States.  
After so many efforts, in April 2004, the European Parliament and the Council 
finally issued Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids -the text now in force- which each 
Member State had to adopt until May 2006. The process involved in that last document 
was remarkable. 
More specifically, the Directive lays down the minimum standards for the conduct 
of takeover bids under a framework of general principles, such as the equivalent 
treatment of shareholders, the protection of minority shareholders in case of change of 
control, the prohibition of market manipulation or abuse, the right of the shareholders to 
have sufficient time and information so as to make a proper decision on the bid, as they 
are all listed in article 3 of the Directive3. 
In the recent Audiolux case4, the ECJ found that the use of the term ‘general 
principles’ in the heading of Article 3 does not imply that the principles listed therein 
should be treated in the same way as the general principles of Community law. Instead, 
the above principles constitute just guiding principles for the implementation of the 
Directive and therefore, should be construed narrowly. Any derogation established by 
Member States must comply with the principles laid down in the Takeover Directive5. 
                                               
3
  See Article 3 of the Takeover Directive, General principles 
4
 Case C-101/08. Audiolux SA and Others. v. Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and Others and Bertelsmann AG 
and Others, Judgement of the Court of 15 October 2009 
5
 Commission report on the application of the Directive on Takeover Bids, Brussels, 28.06.2012, COM (2012) 347 
final, p 2-3.  
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Further, recital (1) of the Directive’s preamble defines Article 50(2)(g) TFEU (ex 
Article 44(2)(g) EC Treaty) as its legal basis. The purpose of the provision is the 
safeguarding of the freedom of establishment as it is set out in Article 49 TFEU (ex 
Article 43 TEC). Therefore, the Directive must be implemented in consistence with the 
EU fundamental freedom of establishment and the aims of the company law 
harmonization programme as an integral part of it (13th Company Law Directive)6. 
The main body of the TOD contains mandatory and non-mandatory provisions for 
Member States. One of the most important obligatory provisions is the MBR of article 5. 
Its significance lies in that it protects the interests of minority shareholders. According to 
this provision, in the event of a takeover, the person (natural or legal person) that has 
acquired a threshold of shares and therefore, the control of the target company, is 
obliged to address a bid to the remaining shareholders (minority shareholders) to buy all 
their shares at an equitable price, so as to acquire the full control over the target 
company7.  
The MBR appears to have its origins back in the UK City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers (1968), aiming at providing fair and equitable treatment to shareholders8 . 
Following the City Code, the TOD requires the buyer to treat all shareholders on equal 
terms by making a bid to buy all their shares at the same price. 
Within the TOD framework, Member States enjoy a certain amount of freedom to 
the extent that they are free to establish more detailed norms into their national legal 
systems, namely to define the threshold percentage of control and to adjust the 
equitable price. Most countries have chosen to apply a threshold of 30%, such as UK 
                                               
6
  For an analysis of the freedom of establishment and harmonization of European company law see: Papadopoulos, 
T. 2007. The mandatory provisions of the EU Takeover Bid Directive and their deficiencies. Law and Financial 
Markets Review, 525-533. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088894;  Papadopoulos, T. 2013. Acquisition of 
corporate control and clear criteria in the adjustment of the mandatory bid price. Law and Financial Markets Review, 
7, 97-106. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2238603 
7
 See Article 5(1) of the Takeover Directive  
8
 The City Code was, until recently, a self-regulatory, formally non-binding body of ‘soft law’, administered by the 
Takeover Panel. With the implementation of the Takeover Directive, the City Code has been put on a statutory 
footing, which, however, did not substantially change the ‘soft law’ approach; See Schuster, E.-P. 2010. Efficiency in 
private control sales–the case for mandatory bids. p. 4-5. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1610259 
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and Germany9. However, the MBR still remains an obligatory rule once the threshold is 
met. 
Almost all Member States have already transposed the Directive into their national 
legal systems, enhancing the harmonization level in the field of private sale-of-control 
transactions10 throughout Europe. 
Outside Europe, the framework under which acquisitions are put into effect is 
different. Thus, before proceeding to the analysis of the MBR nature and purpose under 
the EU Directive regime, we will provide an overview of the second approach in 
regulating private sales of corporate control, the so-called ‘’Market Rule’’, which has 
been adopted mostly in the United States.  
 
 
1.2. Mandatory Bid Rule vs. Market Rule 
 
The fundamental difference between the MBR and the MR is that the latter allows 
an acquirer to gain control of a company without any obligation towards the remaining 
shareholders.  
More specifically, under the MR or ‘’private negotiation rule’’, any transfer of 
control is effected by private agreements among the seller and the potential buyer. 
Therefore, the seller is allowed to sell his shares at the best achievable price without 
any requirement to share the consideration paid. Similarly, the acquirer is not obliged to 
make an offer to the remaining shareholders to buy all their shares. Instead, he/she 
enjoys the freedom to choose whether or not to buy the residual shares and at which 
price. 
 
This deregulatory approach treats sales of corporate control like private property 
sales11. From an economic perspective, the MR is supported to be more efficient than 
                                               
9
 For the UK see Rule 9.1 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. For Germany see §§ 29, 35 
Wertpapiererwerbs-und Übernahmegesetz (WpÜG).  
10
 According to Sepe, the private sale-of-control transactions are considered to be the ‘’friendly’’ form of a takeover ; 
unlike hostile takeovers, they are private agreements for the transfer of control in a company resulting from direct 
negotiations between the current owner of a controlling block and the potential buyer outside the stock exchange. 
For an analysis of sale-of-control transactions see: Sepe, S. 2010. Private sale of corporate control: Why the 
European mandatory bid rule is inefficient. Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086321 
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the MBR, as the latter is believed to create high costs and reduce incentives for 
potential buyers, therefore preventing value-increasing transactions. 
However, Americans have subjected the unlimited freedom of shareholders to sell 
their shares into three exclusive exceptions; the ‘’looting of the corporation’’, ‘’payment 
for a sale of office” and ‘’diversion-of-corporate-opportunity’’12. Whenever one of these 
exceptions applies, an ‘equal sharing rule’ is actuated, replacing the basic MR. 
The main reason for the absence of compulsory public offers in the US takeover 
regulation is that US financial markets are powerful and corporations have widespread 
ownership structures. Thus, the US corporate governance rules were drafted to favour 
the boards of directors. In contrast, EU regulation aims at protecting the minority 
shareholders of the structurally more concentrated EU corporations. Even in the largest 
EU corporations, ownership may be concentrated in few hands. 
However, corporate structures are not universal even within Europe; For instance, 
British corporations have widespread ownership structures. On the contrary, Continental 
European companies are more concentrated, usually held by families or institutions 
which exercise control over the management. According to Marco Ventoruzzo, the 
divergence in ownership structures explains why the US takeover regime differs from 
the EU takeover legislation13.  
The disparities in the ownership patterns of US and EU Continental corporations 
reflect the different commercial, cultural and historical background of the US and the EU 
and therefore, the different rationale behind their legal rules. While US takeover 
approach is based more on the role of financial markets, either implicitly or explicitly14, 
EU takeover regulation is based on Community legislation and principles and therefore, 
is intended to ensure fairness for all shareholders, especially minority ones, in a 
corporate transaction. This value of fairness is predominant even if it makes takeovers 
                                                                                                                                                                
11
 Schuster, E.-P. 2010. Efficiency in private control sales–the case for mandatory bids. p. 3. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1610259 
12
  Sepe, S. 2010. Private sale of corporate control: Why the European mandatory bid rule is inefficient. Arizona Legal 
Studies Discussion Paper. p. 17-18. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086321 
See, e.g, the case of Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. Denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955) 
13
 Marco Ventoruzzo, The Thirteen Directive and the Contrasts Between European and U.S. Takeover Regulation : 
Different (Regulatory) Means, Not So Different (Political and Economic) Ends? Bocconi University Institute of 
Comparative Law "Angelo Sraffa" (I.D.C.). Research Paper No. 06-07. p. 32.  Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=819764 
14
 In US, takeovers are regulated by a combination of state and federal-level legislation. Each set of rules has a 
different scope. 
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more expensive15. With this in mind, importing a ‘’market rule’’, developed within the 
American institutional setting, into the EU Takeover regulation would rather undermine 
the EU governance system and its purposes. For the same reasons, in forming new 
takeover regulation after the UK City Code, EU Continental states rejected the 
American model and its divergent approach towards shareholder protection16. 
On this point, a detailed description of the basic scheme underpinning the 
adoption of the MBR is a necessary premise for better understanding the European 
approach.  
 
1.3. The Mandatory Bid Rule scheme 
 
As seen above, the MBR requires the acquirer -either acting individually or in 
concert with other persons- to make a bid for the entire corporation and offer the same 
price to all shareholders once acquired beyond a certain percentage of shares. In the 
words of its supporters, the necessity of the rule is dictated by three interactive 
rationales, the principle of equal treatment, the protection of minority shareholders and 
the efficiency and integration of the European equity market. For reasons of 
convenience, each one of them is separately presented. 
 
  
                                               
15
 Marco Ventoruzzo, The Thirteen Directive and the Contrasts Between European and U.S. Takeover Regulation : 
Different (Regulatory) Means, Not So Different (Political and Economic) Ends? Bocconi University Institute of 
Comparative Law "Angelo Sraffa" (I.D.C.). Research Paper No. 06-07. p. 77. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=819764 
16
 Kirchmaier, T., J. Grant, et al. (2009). Financial Tunnelling and the Mandatory Bid Rule (January 2009). FMG 
Discussion Paper No. 536. p. 5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=613945 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.613945 
The increasing globalization has raised discussions on the best corporate model and the barriers to the establishment 
of a single, unified system of corporate governance. See also Goergen, M., M. Martynova, et al. (2005). "Corporate 
governance convergence: evidence from takeover regulation reforms in Europe." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
21(2): 243-268. 
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1.3.1. The principle of equal treatment 
 
Under the equal treatment principle, controlling shareholders, managers and any 
other persons participating in the company, must treat all shareholders within each 
separate class of shares on equal terms. Equal treatment must prevail each time a 
change in the controlling ownership of the company takes place.  
Article 3(1)(a) of the Directive specifically provides that: ‘’All holders of the 
securities of an offeree company of the same class must be afforded equivalent 
treatment ‘’. 
In other words, the bidder must make the same offer to all holders of the same 
class of securities and not discriminate among them within the bid ("equality within the 
bid")17. 
At first glance, this principle seems to have been introduced on the basis of the 
principle of equality that is inherent in Company Law. It should be noted, though, that 
the latter only refers to the relationship between a company and its shareholders, not 
the relationship amongst the existing shareholders and a potential shareholder. Instead, 
the principle of equal treatment applies with regard to public takeover bids made by 
prospective shareholders in the stock market.  It also applies to all bids, either voluntary 
or mandatory18. 
Moreover, the equal treatment principle appears to be intrinsically linked to the so 
called ‘’sharing rule’’ or ‘’equal opportunity rule’’, and therefore to the MBR. According to 
that rule, all shareholders are entitled to share the control premium19 that was paid by 
the acquirer to the former controlling shareholder. This process requires the person that 
has obtained above the threshold percentage of control to offer the remaining 
shareholders of the company the same price for their shares as that paid for the 
controlling blocks. To that effect, the right to equal treatment means the right of all 
shareholders to tender their shares under the same terms, namely to obtain the same 
price.  
                                               
17
 Mucciarelli Federico, Cross-border Tender Offers, the Exclusion of Certain Shareholders and the Principle of Equal 
Treatment, Uniform Law Review, Vol. 14, Issues 1/2 (2009), pp. 176 
18
 Maul, S. and A. Kouloridas (2004). "Takeover Bids Directive, The German LJ 5: 355. p. 356, 361-362 
19
 The control premium is an amount above the current market price which an investor is willing to pay in order to 
acquire control of a corporation.  
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Following the distinction between the EU and the US approach on takeovers, a 
reference to the US view on the issue of the premium distribution is important, as well.  
Thus, outside the scope of the European MBR, there is the US ‘’deregulatory’’ school of 
thought which supports that the seller of a controlling block should never be obliged by 
law to share the control premium20. Both schools of thought attract significant criticism, 
demonstrating the weaknesses of each one. 
Still, the overall philosophy behind the European ‘’egalitarian’’ approach is equality 
of all shareholders. And as there is a strong likelihood the control of a company to pass 
at the acquirer’s hands to the detriment of the remaining shareholders, the latter should 
equally have an exit opportunity by selling their interests.  
Hence, the role of the MBR is primarily to protect the minority shareholders by 
offering them the chance to leave the company on terms no less favourable than those 
under which the former controlling shareholder sold his/her controlling block21. 
 
1.3.2. The protection of minority shareholders 
 
Article 5 (1) of the Takeover Directive provides: 
 
‘’ Where a natural or legal person, as a result of his/her own acquisition or the 
acquisition by persons acting in concert with him/her, holds securities of a company as 
referred to in Article 1(1) which, added to any existing holdings of those securities of 
his/hers and the holdings of those securities of persons acting in concert with him/her, 
directly or indirectly give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that 
company, giving him/her control of that company, Member States shall ensure that such 
a person is required to make a bid as a means of protecting the minority 
shareholders of that company. Such a bid shall be addressed at the earliest 
                                               
20
 Jennings, Nicholas. Mandatory Bids Revisited [article], Journal of Corporate Law Studies , Vol. 5, Part 1 (April 
2005), p. 44 
21
 The possibility to exit from the company is also given to minority shareholders through the sell-out mechanism 
(article 16 of the TOD), which follows a mandatory bid. The mechanism aims at protecting the remaining 
shareholders from staying trapped in a company with the new controller by providing them a second opportunity to 
sell their shares at a fair price and leave the company. 
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opportunity to all the holders of those securities for all their holdings at the equitable 
price as defined in paragraph 4.’’ 
As can be seen from the wording of the above article, in combination with the 
general principles of article 3 of the Directive22, the protection of minority shareholders 
is, in essence, the ‘’raison d’être’’ of the MBR. This is also evident from recital 9 of the 
Directive’s preamble (Member States should take the necessary steps to protect the 
holders of securities in particular those with minority holdings, when control of their 
companies has been acquired...).  
In any event, the protection of minority shareholders is grounded on the principle 
of equal treatment upon a change of control, as was cited beforehand. Therefore, it 
should be interpreted with respect to the granting to all shareholders of both the right to 
share the premium and the right to exit the company. The exit right, in particular, gives 
the minority shareholders the opportunity to decide on whether they will remain a 
minority or sell their shares (reinstatement of choice)23. 
This dilemma is born whenever a person acquires control of a company and that 
control results in crucial changes. First of all, the incumbent management, which used 
to conduct the company affairs without any pressure or intervention in the decision 
making-process, stops to exist. Hereinafter, the acquirer has the full power to exert 
pressures over the management decisions so as to be in line with his/her wishes24. 
 Apart from the changes to the structure of the company, the control acquisition 
affects the nature of the investment, as well. The ‘’share in an independent company’’ 
becomes a ‘’share in an acquired target’’ 25 . Therefore, the element of choice that 
characterized the shareholders’ decision on the original investment suddenly 
disappears at the expense of that investment. Imagine, for example, a company which 
                                               
22
 Article 3(1)(a) of the Directive specifically states: ‘’.. if a person acquires control of a company, the other holders of 
securities must be protected; ’’ 
23
 Jennings, Nicholas. Mandatory Bids Revisited [article], Journal of Corporate Law Studies , Vol. 5, Part 1 (April 
2005), p. 41 
24
 Even if the acquirer does not conduct business at the expense of minority shareholders, it is supported that any 
change in the company’s strategy by him justifies a ‘reinstatement of choice’. See Jennings N., supra n 25, p. 42. 
25
 Jennings, Nicholas. Mandatory Bids Revisited [article], Journal of Corporate Law Studies , Vol. 5, Part 1 (April 
2005), p. 41  
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used to produce cars and now manufactures armaments26. Imagine also each target 
company that is taken over by a large corporate group; inevitably, the corporate group 
determines the nature of the businesses of the target company and the way they are 
conducted.    
In fact, many EU jurisdictions provide only for the MBR as an effective defence 
mechanism against acquisitions of control which do not entail a full offer to all 
shareholders. This means that the right to exit may be the result of the absence of other 
minority protection remedies provided for by law. In general, a minority shareholder will 
likely fail to achieve an appropriate price for his/her share in the market, compared to 
that paid by the bidder in gaining control. To that end, the MBR guarantees that, in any 
case, each shareholder will receive an equitable price for his/her stake. 
In this context, the MBR constitutes the most essential statutory tool for the 
protection of minority shareholders against adverse changes of control. It also 
constitutes a substitute for other minority protection devices to ensure fair conduct of the 
controlling shareholders. Similar reasons justify the introduction of the sell-out and 
squeeze-out provisions, which are subsequently presented. 
 
1.3.3.  Efficiency and Integration on equity markets  
 
The Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission Proposal recognizes integration 
of European financial markets as a key objective of the TOD27.  Furthermore, according 
to the Commission Report on the implementation of the Directive, the very purpose of 
its adoption is to promote integration of European capital markets. This would be further 
achieved by creating favourable conditions: efficient takeover mechanisms, a common 
regulatory framework and strong rights for shareholders, including minority 
shareholders28. 
                                               
26
 This is an example often used by Lee Peter, Deputy Director-General of the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
(until 2002); see Jennings, Nicholas. Mandatory Bids Revisited [article], Journal of Corporate Law Studies , Vol. 5, 
Part 1 (April 2005), p. 42 
27
 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Takeover Bids (COM (2002) 534) of 2 October 2002, 
Explanatory Memorandum 
28
 Commission report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, Brussels, 21.02.2007, SEC (2007) 
268, p 3.  
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In the eyes of the EU legislators, a “level playing field” instrument is necessary for 
the achievement of allocative efficiency. Under this framework, Member States are not 
allowed to raise national barriers to foreign bidders. The MBR, therefore, becomes a 
neutral, homogeneous element of the mechanism aiming to create uniformity across 
Europe. In turn, uniformity and harmonization in the field of takeovers prevent national 
laws from distorting the market and therefore, promote corporate restructuring and 
higher firm valuations. 
In other words, the MBR was planned to foster EU integration and the emergence 
of robust market players, who will become competitive inside Europe but also at a 
global level 29 . Sepe agrees that Europe needs corporate restructuring and capital 
market integration to be competitive in a worldwide market economy30.  
In this context, the salutary benefits accrued to the minority shareholders entail 
benefits for the financial markets in general, which means greater market integration 
within the Union. The equal treatment principle in combination with the exit right are 
considered to lead to the reduction of equity capitals and ultimately, in corporate 
efficiency.  
Efficiency means that corporate assets are allocated to their most productive uses. 
In this sense, the underpinning argument in favour of the MBR is that the rule prevents 
inefficient (value-decreasing) transfers of control. More specifically, the obligation of the 
controlling shareholders to share the control premium is a guarantee that the acquisition 
creates sufficient added value to be set off with the acquisition costs. 
Even if Member States are free to adopt further protective measures at national 
level, uniformity and harmonization of takeover regulation are considered to be an 
important step towards a pan-European acquisitions market and therefore, towards the 
full integration of capital markets. 
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Part II. The deficiencies of the Mandatory Bid Rule 
 
2.1. The operation of the rule: emerging issues 
 
After almost a decade of the introduction of the MBR, an overall assessment of its 
operation may be well-founded. Despite its intuitive nature, the rule has received much 
criticism.  
There are several reasons why a bidder may wish to acquire control of a company. 
First of all, the prospective acquirer may be confident that he will run the business in a 
more profitable way than the existing management. In this case, the result is a value-
increasing transaction in the interest of all shareholders.  
The acquirer may also wish to gain control of a corporation for his own interests. 
That is the other side of the coin, meaning diverting corporate opportunities to the 
detriment of the minority shareholders. However, opportunistic buyers seem to be 
discouraged by the MBR veil protection (equal sharing rule and exit right) over the 
minority shareholders. 
Whatever the case may be, the MBR is still criticized by legal scholars to create 
disincentives for both the acquirer and the shareholders. The acquirer may not afford 
the increased costs of the takeover transaction, namely the purchase of all the shares 
and the cash consideration, while the shareholders may not wish to sell their controlling 
blocks, as they are not permitted to exploit the premium for their holding. All these data 
make sale-of-control transactions much more expensive.  
From an economic perspective, in particular, the MBR is considered to prevent 
rather than promote value-maximizing transactions. In practice, the enhanced protection 
of minority shareholders leads to the reduction of equity capital while increasing the 
value of minority shareholdings31. The higher the price of the bid, the greater the benefit 
of minority shareholders, but the cost of acquiring control is similarly greater. What 
happens, in reality, is that the seller of a controlling block usually spends time and effort 
to negotiate the best achievable price whereas the minority shareholders are ensured 
that they will receive the same price without suffering any costs. This means that the 
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latter will grab the opportunity to free ride on the efforts of both the acquirer and the 
controller and benefit from the respective wealth transfer. In turn, investors will buy the 
minority shareholdings at the higher price and the incumbent shareholders’ private 
benefits of control will be higher than those of the potential acquirer32. 
 These problems are likely to prevail in economies characterized by concentrated 
corporate ownerships, as in Continental Europe. Instead, in UK for instance, the 
absence of controlling blocks in listed corporations makes the adverse effects of the 
MBR of little, if any, importance. For investors that wish to acquire a control stake in a 
widely dispersed corporation, with many shareholders, the MBR seems an unattractive 
rule with minor effects. On the contrary, in Continental systems the MBR has been 
proved to have an adverse, ‘’chilling’’ effect, due to the concentration of the company 
shares in few groups of shareholders, usually families, which select the management 
and monitor the decision-making process. In this context, majority shareholders in EU 
Continental corporations are also able to extract or preserve benefits to the detriment of 
minority shareholders33. Considering all the above, in combination with the high costs of 
acquiring control, one can realize that the MBR leads to the reduction of corporate 
wealth by preventing a large number of value-increasing transactions 34 . When 
ownerships are highly concentrated, the rule actually functions as an anti-takeover 
defence, preventing corporate acquisitions.  
Moreover, the bidder who wishes to acquire control of a company that consists of 
different classes of share capital, will have to make ‘’comparable’’ offers to the holders 
of those different classes of shares35. As far as a potential buyer may be willing to pay 
more for a multiple-voting share that will give him higher level of control, this situation 
seems inconsistent with the equal sharing principle, as it was described above. 
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In view of the diversified ownership corporate patterns that exist inside the Union, 
harmonization in the area of takeovers seems still far from purpose. Eventually, taking 
into consideration that the Directive provides a certain degree of discretion to Member 
States, harmonization throughout Europe is also precluded by the various national 
mandatory bid regimes, regulating further bid details or establishing derogations that 
offer more or less protection to minority shareholders.  
In the eyes of its opponents, it seems that the destined functions of the MBR as a 
key mechanism in the dynamic, efficient allocation of corporate control and as a 
gatekeeper of the protection of minority shareholders are not completed. However, both 
the principle of equivalent treatment and the protection of minority shareholders as well 
as market efficiency and integration are still used as arguments in favour of the 
introduction of the MBR. Even the keen supporters of the rule, though, recognize the 
many imperfections stemming from the vagueness of its wording. 
 
2.2. Issues related to the wording of the rule 
 
In order to implement the MBR, each Member State has to supplement it with 
more specific norms and details, such as the bid threshold and the bid price. 
 
2.2.1.  The mandatory bid threshold 
  
As previously discussed, the MBR guarantees that the acquirer is obliged to make 
a bid to all shareholders of securities for all their holdings at an equitable price once 
he/she reaches a certain percentage of voting rights giving him the control of the target 
company36. In few words, the point at which the bidder is obliged to make a public offer 
is called the control threshold. 
According to paragraph (3) of article 5, the control threshold and the method of its 
calculation are left to be defined by the Member States. In this context, national 
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authorities should define control thresholds at a level that represents the percentage of 
voting rights needed for gaining control of a corporation in the different Member States. 
It is evident that the provision on the control threshold is not very clear. The major 
issue raised from the wording of the above provision is the wide discretion granted to 
the Member States in appointing a threshold. This may be the result of the efforts to 
compromise the different positions of Member States on the issue. 
 In any case, the absence of a clear definition of the control threshold or a method 
of its calculation does not contribute to the harmonisation on takeovers throughout the 
EU. It is, in particular, inconsistent with the minimum harmonization technique adopted 
by the Community legislature in Article 3(2) of the Takeover Directive. Thus, since the 
adoption of the Directive, there have been twenty-eight 37  widely divergent control 
thresholds within the Union.  
 
2.2.2.  The mandatory bid price 
 
As discussed above, in case an acquirer reaches the control threshold, the 
mandatory bid should be addressed to all the shareholders of the target company, for all 
their holdings, at an equitable price. The equitable price is defined in paragraph 4 of 
article 5 of the TOD. 
The above paragraph declares as its primary purpose the protection of minority 
shareholders to the extent that the latter are provided an exit on fair price. Either 
someone perceives the rule as an exit right or as a ramification of the equivalent 
treatment principle, the point is that the minority shareholders are able to sell their 
shares to the acquirer of control.  
The price of sale is left to the discretion of Member States. This means that 
different national laws may define different bid prices by taking into consideration 
different criteria.  
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The above differences result, in particular, from two major issues; first, which 
should be the calculation basis of the price. Second, how much of the controlling 
premium should be divided38.  
Starting with the first issue, the Directive has chosen the calculation technique of 
the highest price paid. Thus, the meaning of the ‘’equitable price’’ in the above provision 
is the highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror, over a period of time prior 
to the offer. That period must not be less than six months and not more than twelve 
months prior to the offer of the bid. The exact period is left to be determined by the 
Member States. 
The justification and the benefits of the highest price paid are to be found in the 
report of the High Level Group on takeover bids, namely the inalienable right of minority 
shareholders to share the premium under the above period and the right of the acquirer 
to determine the maximum price he will pay in order to acquire all the securities of the 
target company39.   
Provided that no exception has been made by the relevant national supervisory 
authorities, the highest price paid rule guarantees that any discrimination between the 
price paid by the acquirer to the seller of the controlling shares and that offered to the 
minority shareholders is prohibited. 
On the other hand, the national supervisory authorities may provide for the 
adjustment of the mandatory bid price or for exemptions from the application of the rule 
under certain circumstances (subparagraph 2 of article 5(4)). This provided power 
should not derive from the need to adjust the takeover regulation to the idiosyncrasy of 
each Member State; it should be an issue of the enforcement of the MBR in individual 
cases40, a case-by-case decision on the application of the rule. An arbitrary, unjustified 
use of this power on behalf of the national authorities contradicts the purpose of the 
MBR itself and further constitutes a violation of article 3 of the TOD, unless some other 
equivalent form of protection is provided41. 
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Hence, apart from the single exception provided in the Directive concerning 
voluntary bids42, the national authorities are entitled to establish derogations from the 
highest price paid rule.  These derogations, however, must be interpreted in a narrow 
sense, in accordance with the general principles of article 3 of the Directive43.  
In the previously mentioned Audiolux case, the ECJ dealt, in particular, with the 
issue of whether the requirement for equal treatment of all shareholders constitutes a 
general principle of EU law in the event of a change in corporate control. The Court 
found that the references to the protection of minority shareholders in certain secondary 
legislative acts, such as the TOD, do not provide evidence on the existence of a general 
principle of EU law. The MBR provided for in the TOD constitutes a specific provision, 
applicable only to situations falling within its scope. Likewise, it cannot be deduced from 
the use of the term ‘general principles’ in Article 3 of the TOD that the principles cited 
therein should be treated in the same way as the general principles of Community law.  
By contrast, from the wording of the article (‘’for the purposes of implementing this 
Directive’’), it is implied that those principles constitute only guiding principles for the 
implementation of the Directive44.  
The above judgment weakens the adjustment mechanism of the bid price and of 
the notion of the equitable price45 . To that end, any additional national criteria or 
derogations established by the national authorities of Member States should be subject 
to a narrow framework. 
 Enriques asserted that Member States already providing for a MBR would 
understandably confirm the variable range of derogations they have in place today while 
those introducing it for the first time would also provide for more or less far-reaching 
derogations46. 
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Last but not least, a takeover rule providing for the highest price paid for the 
shares, in a time period prior the acquisition that triggers the bid implies that the entire 
maximum premium for control is offered to all minority shareholders47.  
 
2.2.3.  Partial Bids 
 
A partial bid entails an acquisition of less than 100% of the target company's 
shares. This is the case when the bidder seeks acquisition of control otherwise than by 
making a general public offer. 
The Takeover Directive does not prohibit partial bids. In this context, there is a 
strong likelihood a bidder to look for a stake below the mandatory bid threshold 
determined by each Member State, which of course is not followed by a bid 
requirement. The reasons can be either the intent to acquire working control or the 
simple desire for a larger stake48. If an existing controlling shareholder holds 10% of the 
voting shares, it would be sufficient to further acquire, for instance, 18% so as to hold 
the reins. 
The fact that the Directive permits partial bids does not imply that Member States 
are not able to prohibit such bids. For example, the UK Takeover Code does not permit 
partial offers unless there is the consent of the Takeover Panel and only in exceptional 
circumstances49. 
Permitting only full bids constitutes an effective protective measure for minority 
shareholders. According to Burkart, a mandatory bid legislation which precludes partial 
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bids contributes to the protection of minority shareholders, even if the bidder is free to 
set the price of the bid50. 
Since the relevant control threshold is not crossed in an acquisition, any obligation 
for a mandatory bid is excluded. As a result, the bidder acquires shares without offering 
any premium. The technique of a partial bid defeats the purpose of the MBR, namely 
the protection of minority shareholders who end up being in a really disadvantageous 
position (no mandatory offer made to all the outstanding shares, so no exit right granted 
to all shareholders).  
 
2.2.4. Consideration paid 
 
The MBR provision provides that in an offer the consideration should involve either 
cash or liquid securities. However, under the above provision cash consideration is 
compulsory (even in the form of cash alternatives) in the following cases:  first of all, 
when the consideration offered includes illiquid securities, not traded on a regulated 
market; second, when the offerror, at the time the bid is still open, acquires securities 
carrying 5% or more of the voting rights of the offeree company in cash; finally, in any 
case that Member States decide to require cash consideration at least as an 
alternative51. 
Ex ante, the cash consideration requirement seems to strengthen the principle of 
equal treatment and therefore, the protection of minority shareholders. However, a 
deeper look at the provision leads to the conclusion that a bid carrying an obligation to 
buy all the shares of a company and offer cash consideration is highly possible to 
discourage prospective buyers. In fact, these features make takeovers very expensive 
and reduce the number of control shifts taking place52. 
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2.2.5. The definition of ‘’securities’’ 
 
Article 2(1)(e) of the TOD call ‘securities’ only the transferable securities carrying 
voting rights in a company. In this respect, neither voluntary nor mandatory bids should 
extend to non-voting shares. This means, however, that the new controlling shareholder 
will presumably make use of his power at the expense of those holding non-voting 
shares who are not granted any exit opportunity by the Directive. 
As seen, however, Member States are free to impose additional protection norms. 
It is expressly stated in recital 11 of the preamble that the obligation for a MBR does not 
apply in cases of securities which do not carry voting rights but Member States are not 
precluded from applying the mandatory bid rules to the above type, or other types as 
well, of securities53. 
Therefore, a more explicit and flexible definition of ‘’securities’’ given by the 
Directive would be more helpful. To that end, holders of non-voting rights would be able 
to ‘’get out’’ from the company after the change of control. Such an exit opportunity 
would be a sigh of relief for the latter, since under the current regime they still remain 
trapped in a company suffering the consequences of the change in control.  
 
2.2.6. The concerted parties  
 
The notion of ‘’concerted parties’’ is another one creating ambiguities in the field of 
takeovers. The definition is given by article 2(1)(d) of the Directive: 
‘’ persons acting in concert shall mean natural or legal persons who cooperate with 
the offeror or the offeree company on the basis of an agreement, either express or tacit, 
either oral or written, aimed either at acquiring control of the offeree company or at 
frustrating the successful outcome of a bid ‘’. 
The ‘’concerted parties’’ element is thus involved in the acquisition of shares 
through the crossing of the control threshold (Article 5(1)). As we analyzed above, the 
control threshold as well as the method and criteria of its calculation are left to the 
discretion of the Member States. It stands to reason that Member States are free to 
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define the percentage of voting rights that gives control to the acquirer or the parties 
acting in concert with him/her. Therefore, they are free to give their own interpretation of 
the ‘’parties acting in concert’’. 
Thereafter, the definition of concerted parties or of the actions taken in 
collaboration with other parties is not harmonized among Member States. Some 
jurisdictions, for instance, have preferred to adopt the Directive’s definition (the UK, the 
Netherlands, Italy) while others have supplemented it with more stringent rules (France 
and Germany)54. 
In this sense, it is feared that the broad discretion of Member States facilitates 
national protectionism in another one field of activity, the field of takeovers 55 , as 
happened several times in the past56. What is more, it circumvents the principle of 
minority protection; cases of hidden de facto control are not covered by the mandatory 
bid provision. As a result, in an attempt to avoid the triggering of a bid, the controller 
may engage in secret elaborate agreements to sell his shares to “white knights”, for 
instance to investment banks, which will hold the shares on his behalf57. Thus, the 
‘’hidden’’ controller will have achieved to acquire control without financing a mandatory 
bid. Once again, the non-controlling shareholders are the losers of the game. 
Finally, the wide discretion situation creates an extremely uncertain environment 
which does not allow either shareholders to develop consistent strategies or investors to 
operate across jurisdictions in Europe. The role of the shareholders is, in general, to 
coordinate actions and pursue corporate governance improvements without a view to 
gaining control of the company. If those actions are assumed to be concert actions, the 
overall percentage of voting shares holding by them may well cross the relevant control 
threshold leading them to launch a mandatory offer. This has also a negative impact on 
investors and markets throughout Europe58. 
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2.3. The relation to other provisions  
 
2.3.1. The breakthrough rule 
 
Article 11 of the TOD introduces the so called ‘’breakthrough rule’’ which warrants 
that, in a takeover situation, the company operates in accordance with the one-share-
one-vote principle, voiding inconsistent arrangements, either in the articles of 
association or in contractual agreements59. 
A close look to the above provision leads to the conclusion that the breakthrough 
rule is intended to facilitate takeovers, by making it harder for the controlling 
shareholder and the incumbent managers to exercise disproportionate control of a 
company. They are not able to use multiple voting rights or transfer restrictions to hinder 
the respective bid. By contrast, they have to compete for control. 
At this point, attention should be paid to the interaction between the breakthrough 
rule and the MBR. The enforcement of the breakthrough rule facilitates the crossing of 
the control threshold by the bidder and therefore, triggers the MBR. Consequently, the 
breakthrough rule promotes the mandatory bid mechanism and the protection of 
minority shareholders. 
However, not a few scholars strongly believe that the two rules are completely 
irrelevant, given that the breakthrough rule is optional and that the most significant issue 
is the current de facto exercise of control by the offeror without the breakthrough 
mechanism60.   
 
2.3.2.  The squeeze-out and sell-out rights 
 
The squeeze-out provision grants the acquirer the right to force minority 
shareholders, who have not previously assented to the bid, to sell their shares to 
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him/her at a fair price. The acquirer is able to exercise this right only if he reaches a 
specific percentage of equity (the squeeze-out threshold), which amounts to 90% (by 
reference to capital and, alternatively, by reference to the voting rights) or 95% 
depending on the Member State’s choice61. 
The squeeze-out mechanism allows a bidder to gain 100% of the share equity of a 
company and hence, to establish a more effective management scheme without having 
to deal with the minority shareholders. On one hand, the rule gives the prospective 
controlling shareholders the impetus to invest and therefore, it promotes freedom of 
establishment and free movement of capital.  
The justification for the introduction of the squeeze-out mechanism is given by the 
European Commission on the Winter Report; the existence of minority shareholders 
after a successful bid and the continuing protection of them, imposes various costs and 
risks; the squeeze-out rule makes takeover transactions more attractive for potential 
bidders; thereby, the rule is seen as a counterpart to the MBR62.  
In sum, the squeeze-out rule mitigates any problems arising between minority 
shareholders and the controlling shareholder after the latter has acquired most of the 
company’s equity share, such as a possible free-riding behaviour by small 
shareholders63. Ultimately, the squeeze-out rule is intended to facilitate takeovers and 
further contribute to the development of the takeover market.  
On the other hand, it could be said that this rule also enhances the protection of 
minority target shareholders, as the latter are -indirectly- given a second chance to sell 
their shares after the first bid has been made. 
The main provision, however, which aims at the protection of minority 
shareholders, is the sell-out rule. According to that rule, minority shareholders are 
entitled to compel the controlling shareholder to buy their shares at a fair price64. Hence, 
the rule provides an exit opportunity to the remaining shareholders, who would 
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otherwise stay trapped in the company and their only choice would be to sell their 
depreciated shares at a low price65.   
Like the squeeze-out, the sell-out rule also prevents conflicts between the 
controlling shareholder and small shareholders. In any case, both mechanisms are 
activated once the bid has been made to all holders of the oferee company’s shares for 
all of their holdings. In other words, the exercise of the squeeze out and sell-out rights 
depend on a prior launch of a mandatory bid.  
As discussed above, the implementation of the MBR is largely dependent on the 
discretion of Member States. Subsequently, the implementation of the above two rights 
is inevitably subject to that discretion. Especially for the sell-out right and the protection 
of minority shareholders, the following strange situation is observed: while the TOD 
introduces the sell-out mechanism to protect the remaining small shareholders, at the 
same time, it invalidates its use by rendering the MBR easily avoidable under the 
different national bid rules and exceptions66. It is evident that the minority shareholders 
still remain in a perplexing situation in which the sell-out rule is without purpose.  
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Part III. The implementation of the Mandatory Bid Rule 
 
3.1. In the European Union 
 
Since its inception, the implementation of the MBR in the majority of Continental 
European States has been inefficient mainly due to the difficulties in delineating the 
‘concerted parties’ and ‘’threshold percentages’’ as well as in adjusting the mandatory 
bid price. With respect to the whole European landscape, those difficulties were 
boosted, as noted above, by the wide discretion granted to the national supervisory 
authorities of Member States in establishing further detailed norms and exemptions 
from the TOD. And this is demonstrated by a series of cases in which dominant 
shareholders, taking advantage of the relevant national bid rules and derogations, have 
acted to the detriment of minority shareholders. 
To begin with, when transposing the TOD in 2007, Italian legislature has replaced 
the previous compromise rule of an average price with the ‘’highest price paid rule’’67 of 
the Directive. Since then, questions were often raised with respect to takeovers that 
have occurred in the Italian market before the transposition of the Directive, as in the 
takeover of company Toro by its competitor Generali and that of the Bank Antonveneta 
by the Dutch bank ABN on March 2006. 
The latter acquisition of the Italian bank Antonveneta is also connected to the 
scandal that led the then governor of the Italian Central Bank, Antonio Fazio, to resign. 
When, in March 2005, ABN was to make a voluntary bid to buy the shares of 
Antonveneta, the Banca Popolare Italiana (BPI), went forward to make a second offer. 
The managing director of the latter bank was then heard to be closely related to Mr. 
                                               
67
 Before the adoption of the TOD, Italian law provided for that the bid price was the arithmetic average between the 
average market price of the twelve months preceding the triggering event and the highest price agreed upon by the 
bidder in the same period for the same shares. With that process, only a part of the premium was given to the 
remaing shareholders. The aim was to both protect minority shareholders and reduce the acquisitions costs for the 
bidder.  
After the transposition of the Directive, the new text of Article 106 Testo Unico Finanziario T.U.F. lays down that the 
price offered should not be less than the highest price paid by the bidder in the twelve months preceding the 
acquisition of the triggering threshold. The whole text of the article is available at www.consob.it 
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Fazio who unfairly favoured BPI over ABN so as to prevent any foreign control over a 
national financial institution which would increase competition in the Italian market68.  
Moreover, in the cases of Pirelli and Fiat, the controlling shareholders maintained 
a controlling stake just under the respective threshold so as to avoid financing a 
mandatory bid. Whereas Pirelli used traditional acquisition methods to avoid crossing 
the mandatory bid threshold, Giovanni Agnelli & C. employed different tactics with the 
use of financial derivatives to stay away from exceeding the 30% of shareholdings in 
Fiat Group Spa69. 
Interestingly, other European countries such as France, have adopted with the 
same statute that implemented the TOD70, some “collateral measures” which might 
hinder takeovers. During the same period, Spain finally adopted a single control 
threshold of 30% of the shareholdings for all Spanish corporations, entirely abandoning 
the previous multi-tiered scheme71.  
The German Beiersdorf case mainly concerns problems arising from the 
interpretation of ‘’concerted parties’’. In the above case, Tchibo bought a control stake 
together with other shareholders, without making a bid for the remaining shares. Since 
the Directive mentions nothing on the issue, this fact illustrates the difficulties in 
establishing legal standards which prevent conducts coordinated by multiple parties 
against minority shareholders. 
                                               
68
 Ventoruzzo, M. (2006). "Europe's Thirteenth Directive and US Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means and 
Political and Economic Ends." Tex. Int'l LJ 41: 171. p. 40-41; See also Ventoruzzo M. Takeover Regulation as a Wolf 
in Sheep’s Clothing: Taking Armour & Skeel’s Thesis to Continental Europe.1 January 2008. Bocconi University 
Institute of Comparative Law "Angelo Sraffa" (I.D.C.). Penn State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-02. p. 17.  
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084429  
69
 Kirchmaier, T., J. Grant, et al. (2009). Financial Tunnelling and the Mandatory Bid Rule (January 2009). FMG 
Discussion Paper No. 536. p. 11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=613945 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.613945 
70
  With Loi n° 2006-387 of March 31, 2006, the French legislature introduced a new type of poison-pills in the form of 
free warrants (bons de souscrition), which can be issued to existing shareholders.  
71
 Kirchmaier, T., J. Grant, et al. (2009). Financial Tunnelling and the Mandatory Bid Rule (January 2009). FMG 
Discussion Paper No. 536. p. 18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=613945 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.613945 
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In June 2012, the European Commission published a report on the application of 
the TOD, indicating the key areas needed to be revised, among which the definition of 
acting in concert, the wide range of national derogations and the control threshold72. 
 
3.2. In EFTA States 
 
Among EFTA States73, Norway applies mandatory bid rules for several years. 
Within the framework of the Takeover Directive, the ruling of the EFTA Court in 
Periscopus AS v Oslo Børs ASA and Erik Must AS case74 has been decisive for the 
interpretation of article 5 of the Directive. The Court dealt in particular with the definition 
of “equitable price” given by article 5(4) of the Takeover Directive as well as the criteria 
for the adjustment of the mandatory bid price by the national supervisory authorities of 
EU Member States laid down in the above article.   
To that end, the EFTA Court adopted certain guiding principles and general 
requirements under which Member States should establish the most appropriate criteria 
for the adjustment of the mandatory bid price in accordance with the needs of their 
internal capital markets 75 . And any discretion afforded to the national supervisory 
authorities should be narrowly construed and adequate justified.   
Against the Norwegian vague legal framework, Periscopus Decision provides for a 
quite precise adjustment mechanism. Thus, the interpretation given by the EFTA Court 
regarding the notion of equitable price and the criteria for the adjustment of the 
                                               
72
 Commission report on the application of the Directive on Takeover Bids, Brussels, 28.06.2012, COM (2012) 347 
final, p 5-9 
73
 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is a free trade organisation between four European countries 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) which operates in parallel with the European Union. The EFTA was 
established on 3 May 1960 as a trade alternative for European states who were either unable or unwilling to join the 
then European Economic Community (now EU). 
74
 EFTA Court, Case E-1/10, Periscopus AS v Oslo Børs ASA and Erik Must AS [2010] 
75
  Such guiding requirements are the protection of minority shareholders and the fundamental freedoms of the EU, 
namely the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment which are either explicitly mentioned or 
implied by the text of the Directive. It was also mentioned above (in the Audiolux case) that the scope of the principles 
referred to in the TOD (Article 3) is restricted and therefore, national authorities have a narrow discretion in granting 
adjustments or derogations.  
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mandatory bid price of Article 5(1) and (4) constitutes a landmark for Member States 
which are hereinafter able to implement the bid rule according to circumstances and 
criteria clearly determined within a more stable and uniform legal framework.  
 
3.3. The case of Greece 
 
Greece has transposed the Thirteen Directive into national Law 3461/2006 76 , 
which applies in takeover bids for the acquisition of securities of a company having its 
registered office in Greece and its securities have been admitted to trading in Greece at 
the date that the decision to launch a bid was made publicly announced and notified to 
the Capital Market Commission (CMC)77.  
The CMC is the Greek regulatory authority competent to supervise a bid, when the 
acquisition of securities exceeds the limit of 1/3 of the total of the voting rights of the 
target corporation. The acquirer is then obliged to submit the bid within a period of 20 
days from such acquisition by offering a fair and reasonable consideration78. 
The above obligation applies also to any person who is holder of more than 1/3 
without exceeding ½ of the total of the voting rights of the target and who acquires 
within 12 months, directly or indirectly, on its own or in cooperation with other persons 
acting for its account or in concert with it, securities of the target which represent at 
least 3% of the total of the voting rights of the target. The foregoing obligation does not 
apply, if the bidder has already submitted a mandatory bid79. 
Furthermore, the Greek Law has established a series of exemptions from the MBR 
which are listed in article 8 of Law 3461/2006. 
Since the implementation of the TOD by the Greek State, a number of acquisitions 
have occurred, either hostile or voluntary, mainly in the fields of telecommunications 
and transportations such as the acquisition of Cosmote by Hellenic Telecommunications 
                                               
76
Law 3461/2006, Transposition of the Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids to the National Legislation, 
Government Gazette A’ 106/30-5-2006 
77
 See Articles 3 and 10 of Law 3461/2006 
78
 Article 7(1) of Law 3461/2006  
79
 Article 7(1) of Law 3461/2006 
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Organization (OTE), of Blue Star Ferries by Marfin Investment Group, of Minoan Lines 
by Grinaldi Group, of Hellas Gold by European Goldfields ltd, etc. 
Particularly in the light of the squeeze-out rule, only four months after the 
implementation of the Directive in Greece, the CMC had to approve the exercise of the 
first squeeze-out rights by Nestle to the shareholders of the Greek public company 
Delta Ice Cream and by Credit Agricole to the shareholders of Phoenix Metrolife 
Emporiki (the insurance subsidiary of Emporiki Bank)80. 
The acquisition that raises the interest of all, is the sale of the majority stake 
owned by the Greek government in Greek (OTE) to the German Deutsche Telekom AG 
in 2011, as the process of that sale entirely ignored the rights of minority shareholders 
and no takeover bid was ever submitted, in breach of articles 3 and 5 of the Takeover 
Directive 81. As a result, a series of accusations and lawsuits against the administration 
of the Capital Market Committee and the German corporation followed.  
The justification used for the refusal to launch a mandatory bid was article 8(g) of 
Greek Law 3461/2006, which exempts companies already been subject to privatization 
processes from the obligation to make a mandatory bid. 
In a question addressed to the Commission by a Greek deputy, the Commission 
replied that the provisions of the MBR, the protection of minority shareholders and the 
equivalent treatment principle, may not have been properly implemented while 
derogations from those provisions adopted has been interpreted too extensively82.  
Against the background of sovereign debt crisis, spread throughout the Eurozone, 
Greek state, seeking to enhance its economy, increase competitiveness and of course 
repay its massive debts, has enacted more broad reforms including further privatization 
plans as well as recapitalization plans of Greek banks. The ECB considers the 
                                               
80
 Rampos, D. (2007). "Squeeze-Outs Arrive-Greece has Entered the Modern Era, with Effective Squeeze-Outs and 
Even Back-Door Delistings Now Possible." Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 26: 30. p. 30-32  
81
 that is to say that the rights of 108.000 natural persons and 4.000 legal persons owning the remainder of the 
shares in OTE were ignored.
 
82
 Question for written answer to the Commission Rule 117 Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL), 26 April 2011, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2011-003959&language=SL 
In a previous question of him related to the case, the Commissioner responsible, Mr McCreevy, had stated that ‘when 
Member States derogate from the mandatory-bid rule, they must nevertheless respect the general principle of 
protection of minority shareholders and ensure that they benefit from a treatment equivalent to that of majority 
shareholders. I have yet to see how the Greek authorities will ensure such protection in the present case...’’ 
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implementation of these plans be consistent with the European regime on takeover 
bids83.  
In that recapitalisation context, several acquisitions have taken place so far, such 
as that of Geniki Bank by Pireaus Bank S.A84 and of Eurobank properties by Fairfax 
Financial Holdings Limited85.   
 
  
                                               
83
 Opinion of the European Central Bank on the recapitalisation of credit institutions (CON/2013/17),12 March 2013, 
p. 3, Application of takeover bid provisions in the recapitalisation process, available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2013_17_f_sign.pdf 
84
 Ανακοινωση σχετικά με την υποχρεωτική δημόσια πρόταση για την απόκτηση μετοχών της «ΓΕΝΙΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ 
ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ A.E.». Available at: 
http://www.ase.gr/content/gr/announcements/companiespress/press.asp?press_id=163841 
85
 Ανακοινωση σχετικά με την υποχρεωτική δημόσια πρόταση για την απόκτηση μετοχών της «EUROBANK 
PROPERTIES ΑΝΩΝΥΜΗ ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ ΕΠΕΝΔΥΣΕΩΝ ΣΕ ΑΚΙΝΗΤΗ ΠΕΡΙΟΥΣΙΑ». Available at 
http://www.ase.gr/content/gr/announcements/companiespress/press.asp?press_id=173021 
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Takeovers are of paramount importance for EU economies. As more and more 
businesses operate across borders, a stable and uniform legal framework is precious. 
Throughout the discussion, we have noted that Takeover legislation is found at the 
interface between company law and capital markets law. As such, it is dependent on the 
interactive principles of minority shareholders protection, equality and fairness, and the 
efficiency and market integration. Although these rationales sometimes seem 
unrealistic, they constitute a hard effort to create a uniform takeover environment, 
enhance competitiveness of national economies and encourage cross border 
transactions. 
No one denies that the MBR suffers from inefficiencies. It could be said indeed 
that it is the mere example of a rule with bipolar effects. It is presented as a strong 
shield of protection for minority shareholders but does not convince that it can perform 
that function. Similarly, the rule is supported to prevent some value-decreasing 
transactions. On the other hand, the way in which the MBR operates to protect minority 
shareholders, excludes certain value-increasing transactions.   
However, the very fact that Europe has finally adopted a common regulatory 
framework, even if with significant national differences, has historic and legal 
significance that should not be underestimated. Legal scholars have many times 
commented on the rule’s failure to harmonize takeover regulation in Europe. Although 
political controversies and compromises still remain, which are depicted in the freedom 
the Directive confers on Member States with regard to defining the bid thresholds and 
the bid prices as well as establishing derogations and exemptions from the MBR, the 
picture of the current situation is that the rule represents a laborious achievement of a 
uniform legal framework throughout Europe.  
Combating the MBR leads nowhere especially now that the MBR mechanism has 
been anchored in EU market practices and would be very difficult to reverse it. A stricter 
harmonisation framework, though, without too much freedom granted to Member 
States, might be needed to make market integration and corporate restructuring more 
effective while protecting minority shareholders. In this way, the European MBR could 
fulfil the purposes of its legislation. We can hope that the European regulators will be 
open to take that into consideration. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of Listed Companies under Majority Control 
 
 
The above figure shows the differences between the EU Continental corporations, 








Figure 2 provides the average shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder in 
corporations of five countries, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom 
respectively87. 
                                               
86
 Barca F. and Becht M. “The Control of Corporate Europe” (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002). 
87
 Ventoruzzo M. Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Taking Armour & Skeel’s Thesis to Continental 
Europe.1 January 2008. Bocconi University Institute of Comparative Law "Angelo Sraffa" (I.D.C.). Penn State Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2008-02. p. 17.  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084429  
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Table 3 presents the year in which a MBR (pre-existent of the TOD or not) was adopted 
in each of the above countries and the threshold percentage of control that triggers the rule in 




                                               
88
 Sapnoti K. Eswar, Has Takeover Regulation Altered Value Creation In the European M&A Market, February 2012, 
London Business School 
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 Commission report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, Brussels, 21.02.2007, SEC (2007) 
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Figure 5. Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids 
Evolution of takeovers in Europe 
 
 
Number of Intra-EU Takeover Deals 2003-2010
 
 
The above tables illustrate the evolution of takeovers in Europe and the respective 
number of intra-EU takeovers for the period 2003-2010, according to the Commission report on 
the application of the Directive on Takeover Bids90.  
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 Commission report on the application of the Directive on Takeover Bids, Brussels, 28.06.2012, COM (2012), p.12 
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